Category: Divorce

I’m sure I’ve said it here before, but I’ll say it again: financial remedy orders are intended to be final. A party is not usually entitled to have a ‘second bite of the cherry’. Accordingly, unless there are grounds for an appeal, the order will usually bring the financial remedy proceedings to a conclusion, save for any action necessary to enforce the order. Anyone who is aggrieved at the contents of a financial remedies order will therefore find it very hard to have the order set aside, and that is especially so if they consented to the terms of the order.

That, however, is what the wife sought to do in the recent case W v H.

The relevant facts of the case (for the purpose of this post – I am simplifying matters to keep the post to a reasonable length) were as follows. The parties were married in 2008 and they have two children. They separated in about July 2013. The husband issued divorce proceedings in that month, and the wife issued her own petition in August 2013. Financial remedy proceedings ensued, agreement was reached, and a consent order was drawn up, setting out the terms of the agreement. The order was approved by the court in May 2015. It provided, amongst other things, for the wife to receive a lump sum of £1.6 million, plus maintenance. The divorce was then finalised, in July 2015.

In September 2018 the wife applied to set aside the consent order, giving four grounds for the application:

1. That she had been subjected to undue influence by the husband;
2. That she had been subjected to duress by the husband;
3. That there had been fraudulent non-disclosure on the part of the husband; and
4. That she had not received proper legal advice on the terms of the agreement.

The application was heard by District Judge Duddridge in the Central Family Court in London. He dealt with the wife’s grounds as follows.

As to point 4, he explained that bad legal advice can never be a ground for setting aside a final financial remedies order, whether made by consent or otherwise. This was because “the interest in finality of decisions outweighed the risk of injustice to a party who had received defective advice”, and also because the consent order would have been approved by the court. The wife’s complaint, however, was not that she had received bad legal advice, but rather that she received no advice about the fairness of the consent order. This was not accepted as a good ground by District Judge Duddridge: the wife was receiving advice from a solicitor at the time of the consent order, and the point about bad advice applied equally to incomplete or insufficient legal advice.

As to points I and 2, District Judge Duddridge found that the wife’s allegations (which I will not detail here) could not amount to duress. They were capable of amounting to undue influence, but did not do so, as her actions revealed that she was acting under her own agency, and were inconsistent with her case that she was compelled by any threats by the husband to agree to the terms he presented her with.

Which leaves point 3, non-disclosure by the husband. Here, District Judge Duddridge found that, before the consent order was approved, the wife was actually aware of most of the matters she claimed that the husband had failed to disclose, and that other matters were of such “doubtful materiality” that he considered that the wife would not succeed in having the consent order set aside on that basis.

There was also the issue of the wife’s delay in making her application. In relation to this, District Judge Duddridge said that he had to consider whether there was a good explanation for the delay. In particular, if the wife was subjected to undue influence or duress, her obligation to act promptly had to be measured by reference to the point in time when she became free from that undue influence or duress. He found that this was likely to be by July 2017, when she sought advice about the implementation of the consent order, but was at the latest by February 2018, almost seven months before she made her application, when she instructed new solicitors. That delay was unexplained and inordinate, and would mean that the application should be struck out, even if, contrary to District Judge Duddridge’s findings as set out above, it had any real prospect of success.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

The full judgment can be read here.

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News of Adele’s separation from her husband, Simon Konecki, has dominated the media over the last few days. Whilst, perhaps, given her success, this is no surprise but ti did make me pause and think, how often do any of us ever stop to think what it must be like for those involved?

The breakdown of any relationship, marriage or civil partnership, is one of the most stressful experiences any of us will ever have to endure.

How much harder it must be to live out that experience under the glare of publicity.

Figures vary as to how much Adele’s fortune might be worth, ranging from US$200million to US$180million and £145 million. There is frenetic speculation as to whether Adele will need to agree to share that equally with her husband.

In reality, we will probably never know but the case does raise a number of important and interesting issues.

The first of those is whether the divorce will take place in England and Wales or in California where the couple has lived and where they have property, even though both are British.

If a divorce were to take place in California, there may well have to be an equal division of their net assets.

The choice of jurisdiction is increasingly an issue which couples must deal with immediately after or even before they decide to separate. It is vital that they receive expert advice from lawyers who specialise in international family work.

If a divorce were to take place in this country, it does not necessarily follow that there would be an equal division.

One point that seems to have been overlooked by the media is that the Court would look at the total capital which had been built up during the marriage not just by Adele but by both parties and then decide how that should be divided.

The “starting point” might be equal division but might not be the result.

The reasons for that are various:

Firstly, English law is based on achieving a fair resolution which does not always mean equality.

Secondly, the couple married in 2016 and appear to have separated towards the end of 2018. Before they married, they had been together for 4 or 5 years.

A relationship of 7 years or so is quite substantially less than the average length of a marriage in this country which is between 11 and 12 years. That might be a reason why an equal division would not be fair.

Perhaps the most important reason why an equal division would not be fair is because of the enormous success which Adele has had, very largely through her own efforts.

She may well be able to successfully suggest that she has made such a special or “stellar” contribution building up a substantial wealth in a very short period of time through her own talent and ability that an equal division would simply not be fair.

Finally, the situation in which Adele and her husband now find themselves could quite easily have been avoided if they had entered into a prenuptial agreement. Such an agreement could have been drafted so it was binding no matter where the couple lived during the marriage and no matter where they might choose to get divorced.

It would set out clearly what they each wished to happen in the event of a separation and divorce.

Prenuptial agreements have a growing status under English law, although judges are not automatically bound to enforce them. They do carry an enormous amount of weight. Apart from setting out what the couple would like to happen regarding their finances and the arrangements for any children they may have.

Graham Coy, London Chancery Lane, graham.coy@stowefamilylaw.co.uk

 

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Arbitration has been available for a number of years to resolve disagreements over arrangements for children when a marriage breaks down and also disputes with regard to finances.

It offers many advantages over the Court system (including speed, cost and flexibility) which is becoming slower and slower and as a result, more expensive.

Arbitration in family law cases received a significant boost in a decision by Mr Justice Moor in the High Court very recently.

The Judge was concerned with an application as to what questions should be put to an expert accountant, but the main point is that he was clearly frustrated by the valuable time of High Court Judges being wasted and endorsed arbitration as a much better way of resolving issues such as the those he had to consider.

Arbitration has been available as a means of dispute resolution for financial issues since 2012 and in relation to children since 2016.

As the largest specialist family law firm in the country, Stowe Family Law is proud to have two family arbitrators:

Graham Coy, London Chancery Lane, graham.coy@stowefamilylaw.co.uk, 020 7421 3300

Gareth Curtis, central Manchester, gareth.curtis@stowefamilylaw.co.uk, 0161 359 5534

Family Arbitration is run under The Institute of Family Law Arbitrators and their website provides some very useful guides to the procedure in relation to financial issues and the procedure in relation to problems concerning children.

Graham Coy

23 April 2019

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One can imagine that it must be very difficult for a party who believes they have succeeded with their case to find that success snatched away from them at the last moment. However, sometimes judges change their mind about decisions they have to make.

As its name suggests, this is what happened in the High Court case H v T (Judicial Change of Mind), which concerned an appeal by a husband against a financial remedies order. The final hearing in the case took place in May last year, but the judgment has only recently been published on the Bailii website.

For the purpose of this post I don’t need to go into too much detail regarding the facts of the case, or the financial remedies order. The parties were married for sixteen years, and have three children. Divorce proceedings took place in 2016, and the wife made a financial remedies application. That application was heard by His Honour Judge O’Dwyer, who awarded the wife some 68% of the capital assets.

The husband appealed. The appeal was heard by Mr Justice MacDonald in the High Court. He explained the ground of appeal, which was that:

“The learned Judge was wrong when he failed to make adequate capital provision for the husband when he awarded the wife at least 68% of the capital assets in circumstances where (1) the wife could re-house at a level the learned Judge found was appropriate without making any, or any significant, departure from equality; and/or (2) the husband was also ordered to pay considerable child maintenance and school fees.”

After hearing the appeal Mr Justice MacDonald circulated a draft judgment to the parties’ lawyers, which indicated that he intended to allow the appeal to the extent of varying the lump sum order made by Judge O’Dwyer, as he considered that Judge O’Dwyer’s award had exceeded the wife’s identified housing need.

It is important to explain here that a judge’s decision in a case is not final until their judgment is handed down. Sending out a draft judgment is not the same as handing it down. The purpose of sending out a draft is to give the lawyers the opportunity to check the judgment, and suggest any corrections or amendments. Normally, the suggestions will relate to relatively minor issues, such as typographical errors, rather than the decision itself. The judge will then consider those suggestions, and make any appropriate corrections or amendments to the draft, before handing down the judgment.

In this case the wife’s counsel, upon receiving the draft, invited Mr Justice MacDonald to reconsider the conclusions expressed in his draft judgment, given “what she contended was a significant material omission in the figures that underpinned those conclusions.” Specifically, he had failed to take into account purchase costs when looking at the wife’s housing need. Whilst not mentioning them specifically, Judge O’Dwyer had taken purchase costs into account, as the wife’s counsel explained, and thus his award provided for the wife’s identified housing need exactly.

This was accepted by Mr Justice MacDonald, who therefore changed his mind, and decided to dismiss the husband’s appeal. He had this to say about the change of mind:

“Whilst I had not formally handed down judgment, and, accordingly, … there was nothing to prevent this change of mind following careful reconsideration … I am conscious that judicial tergiversation [i.e. change of mind] is, rightly, not encouraged. Not least in this case because the husband will have considered himself successful by reference to the draft, only for the court to reach the opposite conclusion in the judgment handed down. Against this however, … a judge must have the courage and intellectual honesty to admit and correct an error or omission and, … in doing so is honouring his or her judicial oath. In the circumstances, whilst, as I can attest, it is an uncomfortable exercise for the judge, particularly where the error or omission acts to change the decision handed down in draft, and is disappointing for the litigant who believed they had been successful, a judge is duty bound to correct his or her omission or error. To do otherwise would not be just.”

I’m sure that the husband would have found the change of mind hard to accept, but obviously, judges can make mistakes just like anyone else, and those mistakes, once brought to light, must be corrected. Normally this will entail correction on appeal, but if the mistake is brought to light before a decision is handed down, then that decision must itself be changed.

You can read the full report of the case here.

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The family courts in England and Wales are renowned for being a popular destination for wealthy and warring international couples. So much so, that London has been dubbed the divorce capital of the world with people racing to file a petition in England so that our courts determine the financial split (if this can not be achieved amicably).

However, last week’s decision in the High Court case of Pierburg v Pierburg may, at last, bring clarification to a long-standing debate concerning how to establish whether the court has jurisdiction to deal with a divorce.

We asked Senior Partner, Julian Hawkhead, to join us on the blog to look at the case and the implications for international divorce cases.

Last week a decision of the High Court was handed down which may, at last, bring clarification to a long-standing debate concerning how to establish whether the court has jurisdiction to deal with a divorce.

As has been explained in previous articles in this blog, where there is more than one EU jurisdiction in which divorce proceedings could be commenced, the EU regulations apply.

In the case of Pierburg v Pierburg, the parties were both German nationals, they had resided since the early 2000s in Switzerland for tax reasons but had taken a rental property in London, mainly because their son had been educated here. When the marriage broke down, the wife in or around July / August 2017 moved into the London property. Her time spent between London and Switzerland was carefully counted by the husband, indeed as were all her movements between the two countries, and her visits back to Germany to see her parents from 2015 onwards.

In January 2018, the wife issued proceedings in England on the alternative bases of (a) having been domiciled in England and resident here for 6 months or (b) having been resident in England for 12 months. The reason for the alternative pleading being the fact that they had held the tenancy of the London property as a rental property for many years prior and that she had regularly spent time in England. A month later, in February 2018, the husband issued in Germany. The German court quickly adjourned the German divorce proceedings until the legitimacy of the English proceedings had been determined as the English proceedings had been issued first.

What is clearly at stake here is a financial benefit. When the parties married in Germany back in 1985 they entered into a separation of assets marital regime in which the wife would also not be entitled to any maintenance provision. The English court, however, would be very likely not to regard such a financial prohibition as fair and would award her substantial maintenance whether in the form of regular payments or more likely a capitalised maintenance sum to provide for her lifelong needs. The husband was resisting England having jurisdiction to prevent this and to limit her financial entitlement by a stricter approach as would be adopted in German.

The case involved substantial assets and high powered people. The husband had made his fortune in the German automotive industry. They lived in a Chateau in French-speaking Switzerland (it was a feature of the husband’s case that the wife had never settled into Switzerland and had not attempted to learn or speak French), the son of the parties was educated at a boarding school in England and they had taken a house in London. The wife called upon the Countess of Chichester and the Chief Executive of the Prince’s Foundation as witnesses of her move to and connections with England.

What is the law concerning jurisdiction?

Article 3 of Council Regulations (EC) no 2201/2003  says that jurisdiction in relation to a divorce shall lie with the courts of the EU member state in various scenarios. I won’t go through them in detail here but they can be found in previous blogs here.

The relevant ones for the purpose of this case were:-

The applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was made;

or

The applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and…in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her “domicile” there.

As mentioned above, the wife sought to rely on pleading both these reasons scenarios in her divorce petition.

The debate that has been ongoing since 2007, in which there were two decisions concerning the basis for establishing jurisdiction through the habitual residence. In the case of Marinos the then Mr Justice Munby took a very literal interpretation of the words habitual residence and residence. He decided that to establish “habitual residence” one needed to be only resident, or living in a jurisdiction for the requisite period of time. This meant that if a person issued a petition on say 1 September 2017, they only needed to have lived for periods of time for the twelve months prior to that time if they couldn’t also evidence domicile there or six months if they could. It is possible to have more than one residence.

Habitual residence, however, has a much stricter definition and a person can only have one habitual residence so that in this case if the habitual residence was the determining factor the wife was either habitually resident in Switzerland or in England.

In the case of Munro, Mr Justice Bennett took an alternative interpretation of the Council regulations namely that to establish habitual residence you had to have been habitually resident and not merely resident in a country for the requisite period of time.

Is this just semantics, lawyers just playing with words? Not at all as the importance is very different and is key to the six and twelve-month timescales to enable a person to establish jurisdiction.

When the regulations first came into effect an explanatory note was produced by Dr Algeria Borras in what is known as the Borras report. The problem has arisen that when this explanatory note was translated into different languages, the word habitual was left out in the English and coincidentally the German translations.

The husband’s legal team, however, showed to the court how in the French, Dutch, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese versions,  by way of example,  the need for the habitual residence was clear. In the English version of that report, it merely says “he or she must have resided there for at least six months”. Therefore supporting the Marinos interpretation of the regulations. However, in this recent case, Mr Justice Moor preferred the husband’s arguments and took a wider view of how the EU regulations had been interpreted around Europe. His attention was brought to the fact that in Finland, Latvia and Sweden, for example, the word “habitual” was not used at all.

Considering all the circumstances of the case Mr Justice Moor came down firmly in favour of the Munro interpretation: namely that to establish habitual residence a person needs to have been habitually resident and not merely resident in a country for the requisite period of time.

He recognised that this might be regarded as controversial as he was disagreeing with the opinions of only the then Mr Justice Munby who went on to become not only a Lord Justice but also the President of the Family Division but also the then Mr Justice Peter Jackson who is now sitting as Lord Justice of Appeal. He points out however that they did not have the benefits of the convincing arguments that he had heard in his particular case.

What then ensued in the case was a forensic examination of the wife’s movements between England and Switzerland from the time she said she was resident in England namely from July 2017 onwards. The reason being that the Judge had to determine three questions:

1. When did the wife become habitually resident in England and Wales?

2. Did she become resident (rather than habitually resident) on a different date just in case the Judge’s interpretation of the Marinos / Munro debate was incorrect?

3. Is she domiciled in England and Wales?

The Judge in reaching his decision draws the distinction between residing somewhere and visiting it. A person can reside in England and visit their own holiday home in another country. He also assessed the extent of her ongoing connections with Germany and in doing so reaches the conclusion that the wife had not changed her domicile to England by 12 January 2018 when she issued her divorce petition. In reviewing all the circumstances of the case the Judge found that the wife could not establish jurisdiction in England at the time she issued her petition and therefore the petition had to be struck out.

Ultimately this is a case motivated by money. The husband’s legal team freely admitted that it related to the financial remedies available to the wife if the divorce is progressed in England rather than Germany as in Germany, according to the marriage contract she would not be entitled to anything including maintenance.

It would, in English law be a travesty for her to receive nothing at all and Mr Justice Moor observes that if remains the case then she may be entitled to bring a claim for financial relief following an overseas divorce under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and he deliberately reserves any such application to himself.

It seems to me this is a stark warning to the husband to ensure that regardless of what the German law may provide he should consider making some acceptable level of financial provision to the wife to ensure fairness is achieved.

Conclusion

This case does bring further weight and clarity to the question of how to interpret habitual residence. Only last year I had a case where the parties had been residing in Spain for many years and then the wife unexpectedly came back to England and commenced divorce proceedings claiming that she was domiciled here and had been resident here for six months prior to issuing the petition. Fortunately, we were able to reach a financial settlement agreement which meant that the parties did not need to spend a significant amount of money arguing about jurisdiction.

The terms of our Brexit from Europe may, of course, put a completely different spin our these regulations and there is plenty of guidance issued looking at different scenarios. What seems likely at the moment is that we will not have a hard Brexit in which case overnight all these EU regulations will fall away and it is likely that we will continue to have a relationship with Europe in some shape or form in which these regulations are likely to continue to apply in some way yet to be finally determined.

In the meantime, what is of vital importance is timing. If there is a case of a possible jurisdiction race then it is essential you seek legal advice at the earliest opportunity from lawyers who specialise in a divorce involving international issues.

Get in touch 

If you require any further advice or information please contact Holly Lamb,  Head of International Family Law

 

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As I’m sure anyone reading this blog is aware, last week the Government confirmed what we already knew, i.e. that it intends to introduce a system of no-fault divorce. The news (if it was actually news) that we are at last to get a no-fault divorce system (as long as nothing, in particular Brexit, gets in the way of the necessary legislation) is obviously most welcome, but has an opportunity to simplify and improve the divorce system even further been missed?

The Government’s proposal is, I would say, quite conservative (with a small ‘c’) when it comes to no-fault divorce systems, retaining a large part of our existing system. In particular, the Government intends to keep the present ground for divorce, i.e. that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The rationale for this given by the Government in its consultation document was the rather negative: “The Government has seen no evidence that it would be effective to remove or replace the sole ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.” The Government also stated rather ‘lacklustrely’ that irretrievable breakdown had “proved effective in many other comparable jurisdictions”. Not a particularly ringing endorsement. Slightly more constructively the consultation response published last week informed us that irretrievable breakdown “was seen to provide a clear and logical threshold”. But just how logical is it, and do we need a ‘threshold’?

As I explained here recently, a ground for divorce is not actually required in some comparable jurisdictions. Spain, Sweden and Finland do not have a ground for divorce. If those countries can manage without it, why do we need it? Why not just have an application to dissolve the marriage? After all, if we will no longer need to prove that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, why do we even need to say it has broken down irretrievably? Why not just say “I want a divorce”? If the court cannot investigate and decide whether the marriage has, in its view, broken down irretrievably, relying solely upon the word of the petitioner, then irretrievable breakdown itself is pointless.

Logically, a ground is not required. It is an unnecessary extra step. If a party to a marriage says they want a divorce, then that, in reality, is the end of the matter. There is nothing that the law can do to change the fact. Yes, the law can, if it wishes, build in a delay to cover the (highly unlikely, from my quarter-century of experience as a family lawyer) possibility that the petitioner may change their mind. But if they don’t change their mind, then the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is a fact. It goes without saying. A marriage to which one party no longer wishes to belong has irretrievably broken down. Requiring that party to say that “I want a divorce because my marriage has irretrievably broken down” is a superfluity. It is like saying “I need to eat because I am hungry”, or “I need to dry myself off because I am wet”. Yes, we know.

And if divorce is effectively going to be an administrative process anyway (and I am not against that), then putting in a legal ground of any sort is completely meaningless. The divorce is a purely tick-box exercise. Removing one of those boxes will make no difference at all.

So we have seen that the Government’s arguments in favour of retaining the irretrievable breakdown ground for divorce simply do not hold water. Other comparable jurisdictions seem to manage quite happily without it, and there is actually no logic in it. Nor is there any logic in suggesting that a ‘threshold’ is needed, when the system never tests to see whether that threshold has been met.

And then we need to look at things from the perspective of the respondent to the divorce. Under the new proposals, they will be told that their marriage has irretrievably broken down, but they will be given no opportunity to argue that assertion. They will not be given the right of anyone else against whom a court process has been initiated: to defend themselves. It will be a fait accompli. Not a very satisfactory situation, from a purely legal perspective. On the other hand, if they are simply faced with the fact that their spouse wants a divorce, then there is really nothing to defend – they can’t say “oh no you don’t!”

Doing away with fault in divorce is obviously a good thing for reducing unnecessary animosity and complexity, but it seems to me that retaining a ground for divorce keeps an unnecessary element of potential animosity and complexity within the system. A ground-less system of divorce would go the whole hog and make the divorce process as ‘neutral’, and therefore as ‘animosity-free’, as possible, as well as making it simpler.

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What a week it has been in family law as the government finally announced its plans for reform to the current divorce law in England and Wales.

Welcomed by us all at Stowe, the reform will see the introduction of “no-fault” divorce and the removal of the need to allocate blame on one party.

Mark Christie from our Harrogate office, has over 35 years family law experience with a focus on divorce, separation and private law children disputes. He joins us today to share his views on the reform of our current “somewhat archaic grounds for divorce.”

This week, the government, after much lobbying from Resolution-First for Family Law, the organisation representing specialist family lawyers for a reform of the somewhat archaic grounds for divorce, announced that it will legislate to reform the grounds for divorce.

The current law necessitates a couple who wish to have a divorce, relying upon one of five separate facts, three of which are fault-based, i.e. adultery, behaviour (often colloquially referred to as unreasonable behaviour) and two years desertion.

In this new announcement, which has been long awaited and which will see the biggest reform in our divorce laws for 50 years, it is proposed that the law will be changed to remove the fault-based facts and for the parties to simply provide a statement to the effect that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.

It is also proposed that the ability to defend a divorce will be removed and that couples can jointly apply to the Court for a divorce.

Once such legislation is passed, it is hoped that couples will be able to obtain a divorce in a much less hostile environment without having to blame each other, and which currently causes unnecessary emotional turmoil to not only the couple divorcing but also to any children of the marriage.

Once it is possible to obtain a divorce without having to blame each other, couples will be able to bring their marriage to an end in a much more amicable manner, which will enhance the prospect of them retaining a reasonable relationship with each other, and so enable them to better co-parent their children and agree on a financial settlement.

Of course, there will be the usual traditionalist criticism of such a move, arguing that making divorce easier undermines the institute of marriage.

The reality, however, is that the proposed legislation will not make the obtaining of divorce any easier but will just remove the “blame game” from the process to the benefit of all parties and any children concerned.

It may be that once the changes come into effect, there will be an initial spike in the divorce rate, but this will only be short lived.

It is to be hoped that the legislation will come into force as quickly as possible, though, considering the current Brexit situation, it is anyone’s guess as to when there will be sufficient parliamentary time available to pass the requisite legislation.

 

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As the Ministry of Justice releases family court statistics that show a 3% increase in new cases and an average 3-week increase in the time to reach a final order (2017 v 2018), it is clear that the courts are struggling to cope with demand.

To relieve some of this pressure, other alternative methods to reaching a resolve in family court matters must be more widely considered.

Faster and more flexible, family arbitration is one of the approaches that could help you and your ex-partner to make final and legally binding decisions whilst avoiding the over-stretched courts.

So how does arbitration work and what are the benefits? We asked Angela Sussens, Partner at our Leeds office to join us on the blog to explain further.

Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution and involves a third party (the arbitrator) adopting the role of Judge. The arbitrator will decide on the issues they are appointed to deal with after reviewing and hearing evidence from both parties in the same way that a Judge would at a final hearing.

When conducting an arbitration, arbitrators are required to apply the law of England and Wales. The arbitrator’s final decision is binding on both parties and is known as an Award (financial matters) or a Determination (children matters). The decision can then be embodied into a Court Order and submitted to Court for approval by a Judge.

To proceed with arbitration, both parties must agree that they are willing to proceed in this way. They are required to sign a document which sets out the rules of arbitration and by signing the document, the parties agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s final decision.

Neither party can subsequently decide that they do not want to arbitrate unless the other party also agrees to terminate the process. Once the arbitrator has accepted the appointment, the arbitration process formally begins. If there are Court proceedings, those proceedings will be put on hold to await the outcome of the arbitration.

The parties can jointly appoint an arbitrator or alternatively, they can elect for the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators (IFLA) to select one for them. There are separate panels for arbitrators who deal with finance or children matters but some arbitrators are members of both panels. Details of trained and accredited arbitrators can be found on the IFLA website. Those listed are experienced family law practitioners who have also completed the family arbitration training course.

How can an arbitrator help you?

Arbitrators can deal with most financial and property disputes arising from family/relationship breakdowns in the same way that a Judge can. Arbitrators are not however able to deal with financial matters where there is an issue over jurisdiction or cases involving the recognition of a foreign marriage or divorce.

Arbitrators can deal with many matters relating to children where the parties have parental responsibility including, but not limited to, where a child is to live, contact arrangements and decisions over education.

Usually, although not always, there will be an initial meeting between the arbitrator and the parties to agree on the steps needed to get the case ready. The arbitrator has the power to make case management and interim decisions such as deciding what evidence is to be provided and whether there is a need for expert evidence.

The arbitrator also has the power to make an order for one party to make maintenance payments to the other pending the outcome of the arbitration if the interim financial arrangements are not agreed.

After the final arbitration meeting, the arbitrator will issue an Award or Determination setting out their decision which is the equivalent of a final judgment and is binding on the parties. The parties are then required to apply to the court for an order replicating the Award or Determination. Only in very rare cases will an Award or Determination not be upheld.  The recent decision of Ambrose J in the case of BC v BG [2019] EWFC 7 reaffirmed this point

 ‘Any application to resile from an arbitration award should be unusual. Applications using the “notice to show cause” procedure or an application for no order to be made (as adopted in this case) should be exceptional for the reasons given in S v S and DB v DLJ’.

What are the benefits?

There are many benefits of arbitration when compared to the traditional court process.

Take less time

Firstly, arbitration is an opportunity to expedite the case and avoid lengthy court delays. It often takes the Court several weeks to issue an application and then a further delay is encountered when listing the matter for hearings. The parties and the arbitrator have total control over the timetable. There is also less risk of a hearing being adjourned or cancelled due to a judge becoming unavailable which happens increasingly often in court proceedings.

More cost-effective

Another benefit is that the arbitration process is often more cost-effective than the Court process although parties are required to meet the arbitrator’s fees which will vary from case to case.

The parties can also elect for arbitration to be completed on paper, if appropriate, which may further reduce costs.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality is also a benefit and arbitration is protected by strict confidentiality rules.

Greater control of the case

Arbitration provides the parties with greater control and flexibility over how the case is managed. The parties can define the scope of their arbitration and if there are specific issues in dispute, while other issues are agreed, the parties can limit arbitration to the issues in dispute.

The parties also decide when and where the hearings are to take place, albeit subject to the arbitrator’s availability. One of the main benefits of arbitration is the ability to appoint an experienced family law practitioner who will deal with the case from start to finish. There are a number of highly regarded family lawyers who are trained as arbitrators, thus giving the parties complete confidence that their dispute will be resolved by someone with the appropriate experience.

Arbitration in action

I was recently involved in an arbitration case dealing with the financial arrangements following the breakdown of the parties’ marriage. In that case, the parties agreed to use arbitration to resolve the issues in dispute between them. The arbitration process was concluded within c.16 weeks. It could easily have taken a year to reach a final hearing within the court process.

The final arbitration ‘hearing’ was dealt with in one day but is likely to have required two days in Court. Costs were contained after we were able to agree on the case management directions with the opposing party and the arbitrator thereby avoiding the need for an interim meeting or telephone appointment. The total costs were considerably less than they would otherwise have been if the matter was dealt with in the standard court process.

While arbitration provides a reliable and comprehensive alternative to the court process, it still involves handing over the final decision to a third party which is not ideal. If there is any scope for the parties to reach an agreement over the issues in dispute through negotiation, this will always be preferable to passing control to someone else.

Get in touch

If you would like some advice on arbitration and how it could help you please do contact me at angela.sussens@stowefamilylaw.co.uk

Details of all of our arbitrators and the work they do can be found here.

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